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It is hard to argue that there is a more prevailing issue than collateral damage when 
discussing strike warfare today. The outlook of the United States and other militaries 
regarding bombing operations, particularly concern about collateral damage, is a 
historically contingent process. This thesis examines three case studies—the Korean War, 
the Vietnam War, and the Kosovo air campaign—to examine the impact of concern about 
collateral damage on U.S. policy and strategy. It analyzes the disparity between collateral 
damage effects at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels over the span of a half 
century.  
A significant amount of research on the effects of collateral damage from strike 
warfare focuses on legal, humanitarian, and moral issues. To oversimplify, killing non-
combatants is bad, but it happens, and not always by accident. Therefore, it is instructive 
to gain knowledge on how it affects policy and strategy. Depending on the conflict and 
time period, U.S. administrations and war strategists have put the priority of mitigating 
collateral damage at different levels. Understanding the reasoning and timing behind the 
political and military attitudes toward collateral damage is helpful to understanding how 
the potential for civilian casualties fits into military strategy as a whole. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
It is hard to argue that there is a more prevalent issue than collateral damage when 
discussing strike warfare today.1 The outlook of the United States and other militaries 
regarding bombing operations, particularly concern about the inevitable destruction of 
civilian lives and property, is a historically contingent process. Such concern has waxed 
and waned in the past, and may well do so in the future. Since the end of the Second 
World War, the enormous increase in attention that U.S. policy makers and military 
leaders have paid to collateral damage effects raises numerous questions. How does 
collateral damage resulting from strike warfare, specifically the killing of enemy non-
combatants, impact U.S. policy and strategy? How has the concern for collateral damage 
at the strategic and political level evolved in the post-World War II era? What has been 
the connection between collateral damage effects at the tactical level and those at the 
strategic level? What factors have influenced this relationship over time?     
This thesis examines three case studies—the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and 
the Kosovo air campaign—to examine the impact of concern about collateral damage on 
U.S. policy and strategy. It analyzes the disparity between collateral damage effects at the 
strategic, operational, and tactical levels over the span of a half century. By analyzing 
how the impact of collateral damage transformed over time, it leads to a better 
understanding of the current and future limitations put on strike warfare. Additionally, it 
helps identify what type of conflict might lead the United States to go back to a pre-
Korean War model of bombing, in which civilian casualties are viewed in neutral or even 
positive terms. In essence, how high would the stakes have to be for both our moral 
scruples and political restraints to decrease?  
This paper is organized into five chapters. The introduction identifies the 
significance of the research and examines the current literature on the topic, including a 
brief discussion on the legal implications of collateral damage. The three chapters 
                                                 
1 For the purpose of this paper, collateral damage refers to the death of enemy non-combatants. It is 
difficult to find a precise definition of collateral damage within military manuals. The latest version of the 
official U.S. Air Force glossary does not give a definition of collateral damage. See U.S. Department of 
Defense, Air Force Doctrine Document 1–2, January 11, 2007, http://fas.org/irp/doddir/usaf/afdd1-2.pdf.   
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chronologically examine the case studies and compare and contrast the impact of 
collateral damage during each conflict. The conclusion examines the findings of the 
research as a whole and look at the possible effects on the future of strike warfare, mainly 
how it relates to a world where limited war and rogue non-state actors have become the 
standard.  
A. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH 
The three case studies chosen are evenly spaced throughout the second half of the 
twentieth century and well illustrate how various factors impacted the effects of collateral 
damage during different time periods. The factors affecting collateral damage have 
different values contingent upon which war is being analyzed. Broadly speaking, this 
study traces a shift in the outlook of both policy-makers and war-fighters, from a “total 
war” model in Korea with limitations based on the war’s global context; to a more self-
consciously limited approach in Vietnam, driven partly by domestic and international 
public opinion; to Kosovo in which the actions of the adversary incited the United States 
and its allies to use a more precise method of bombing. 
A significant amount of research on the effects of collateral damage from strike 
warfare focuses on humanitarian and moral issues. To oversimplify, killing non-
combatants is bad, but it happens, and not always by accident. Therefore, it is instructive 
to gain knowledge on how it affects strategy. Depending on the conflict and time period, 
U.S. administrations and war strategists have put the priority of mitigating collateral 
damage at different levels. Understanding the reasoning and timing behind the political 
and military attitudes toward collateral damage is helpful to understanding how the 
potential for civilian casualties fits into military strategy and operations as a whole. 
As important as the humanitarian and moral aspects are regarding collateral 
damage, they are topics that lend themselves to a substantial amount of subjectivity that 
this paper hopes to minimize. The legal aspect, although not the focus of this paper, 
cannot be ignored because of the implications on policy makers’ decisions in selecting air 
power as a tool for imposing the will of the United States. Since the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions, the United States—as evident in its reluctance to sign the succeeding 
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protocols to the original documents—has taken a more liberal approach than many other 
countries concerning collateral damage. Since the potential for collateral damage vis-à-
vis targeting was a prominent issue in the three case studies being examined, it is 
instructive to understand the U.S. interpretation of what constitutes a legal target.  
The U.S. military’s past and current position on what it considers lawful targeting 
is best summed up in The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations 
which states: “Only military objectives may be attacked. Military objectives are 
combatants, military equipment and facilities, and those objects which, by their nature, 
location, purpose, or use, effectively contribute to the enemy’s war-fighting or war-
sustaining capability and whose total or partial destruction, capture, or neutralization 
would constitute a definite military advantage to the attacker under the circumstances at 
the time of the attack.”2 With regard to attacking civilians, the handbook states that, “it is 
not unlawful to cause incidental injury to civilians, or collateral damage to civilian 
objects, during an attack upon a legitimate military objective.”3 The phrase “contribute to 
the enemy’s war-fighting or war-sustaining capability” in particular has afforded military 
commanders a good deal of flexibility when planning and executing attacks, without, 
however, dispensing entirely the anxiety about what constitutes justified destruction of 
civilian life and property. This issue always gets negotiated in real time, as operations 
proceed.  
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There is a limited amount of literature dedicated exclusively to the strategic 
effects of collateral damage from strike warfare. As a result, a significant amount of the 
thesis extracts information from various authors’ description of collateral damage during 
each of the wars being examined. One of the few pieces of literature that solely addresses 
collateral damage as a result of strike warfare is Patrick Shaw’s thesis Collateral Damage 
                                                 
2 U.S. Department of the Navy, NWP 1–14M, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval 
Operations (July 2007): 8–1, 8–3, https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/a9b8e92d-2c8d-4779-9925-
0defea93325c/. 
3 Ibid. Although a U.S. Navy publication, the language on collateral damage and targeting is consistent 
with previous Air Force publications, such as Air Force Pamphlet (AFP) 110–34, Commander’s Handbook 
on the Law of Armed Conflict, July 25, 1980, that have since been rescinded or superseded.   
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and the United States Air Force, which discusses the progression of USAF concerns 
pertaining to collateral damage and argues that those concerns have led to a decrease in 
air power’s effectiveness.4 This thesis looks to build off Shaw’s argument by focusing on 
the strategic and political impacts of collateral damage and enhance the connection 
between the strategic and tactical levels. 
Many books on the Korean and Vietnam wars analyze collateral damage in 
conjunction with other strategic bombing aspects such as political leaders’ selection and 
approval of targets, the use of propaganda by the enemy, and the impact of precision 
guided munitions. As the effects of collateral damage became much more visible because 
of mass media during the latter part of the twentieth century, more literature was written 
about the topic. Although the Kosovo war produced a minuscule amount of collateral 
damage from bombing when compared to Vietnam and Korea, there are a number of 
journal articles on Kosovo that specifically address the topic.  
1. Korea 
The Korean War’s proximity to World War II significantly impacted both 
politicians’ and military leaders’ attitudes toward collateral damage from strike warfare. 
The same leaders who relentlessly and indiscriminately bombed Japanese civilians just 
five years earlier were the individuals commanding the Korean War. This connection 
played an integral role in the decision-making processes for the strategic bombing of 
Korea. Although the Geneva Conventions of 1949 brought to light the legal and moral 
implications of collateral damage, the difficulty for some leaders to abandon their old 
habits was quite evident. 
Mark Clodfelter’s book, The Limits of Air Power, focuses mainly on the Vietnam 
War but also reviews how politicians and military leaders during the Korean War were 
influenced heavily by their World War II experiences.5 Clodfelter examines the transition 
from President Truman to President Eisenhower and its impact on the prioritization of the 
                                                 
4 Patrick M. Shaw, “Collateral Damage and the United States Air Force,” (master’s thesis, U.S. Air 
Force School of Advanced Air Power Studies, 1997) http://www.dtic.mil/get-tr-doc/pdf?AD=ADA391809.  
5 Mark Clodfelter, The Limits of Air Power: The American Bombing of North Vietnam (Lincoln, NE: 
Bison Books, 2006), 12–26. 
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potential effects from collateral damage. Conrad Crane looks at the transformation in the 
military leaders’ concern for civilian casualties over time in American Airpower Strategy 
in Korea, 1950–1953 and Bombs, Cities, and Civilians: American Airpower Strategy in 
World War II.6  Both authors portray an administration and group of military leaders that 
grew anxious to end the wars in Korea and Vietnam and reduced the limitations put on 
strategic bombing to force agreements. These restrictions included the concern for 
collateral damage and especially the potential for collateral damage if nuclear weapons 
were used.  
Another theme often examined in the literature on Korea investigates the extent to 
which U.S. forces attempted to warn civilians of impending attacks to reduce collateral 
damage. Clodfelter and Crane both point out that actions such as dropping leaflets and 
warning civilians with loud speakers from low flying aircraft were employed by U.S. 
forces. On the contrary, Bruce Cummings mentions very little about precautions taken in 
his book The Korean War and gives a very critical view of the bombing campaign by 
equating it to genocide.7 Although Cummings portrays an American Air Force with no 
limitations put on them, in reality the Korean War was the first conflict among many 
throughout the second half of the twentieth century in which the United States fought a 
limited war with numerous restrictions put on its forces. The effects of these limitations 
are examined in Thomas Hone’s chapter “Strategic Bombardment Constrained: Korea 
and Vietnam” in Case Studies in Strategic Bombardment, which looks at how political 
constraints impacted the Korean and Vietnam bombing campaigns.8 Hone’s chapter and 
Stephen T. Hosmer’s, “Constraints on U.S. Strategy in Third World Conflict,” are 
                                                 
6 Conrad C. Crane, American Airpower Strategy in Korea, 1950–1953 (Lawrence: University Press of 
Kansas, 2000); Conrad C. Crane, Bombs, Cities, and Civilians: American Airpower Strategy in World War 
II (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1993). 
7 Bruce Cummings, The Korean War (New York: Random House, 2010), 149–161. 
8 Thomas C. Hone, “Strategic Bombardment Constrained: Korea and Vietnam,” in Case Studies in 
Strategic Bombardment, ed. R. Cargill Hall (Washington, DC: Air Force History and Museums Program, 
1998), 469–519. 
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excellent sources on the limitations put on air power during Korea and Vietnam and 
complement this paper’s argument.9   
One of the most significant limitations put on aircraft to avoid collateral damage 
during the Korean War involved target selection. Robert Futrell takes an in depth look at 
the progression of target selection throughout the war and gives a great overview of the 
U.S. Air Force’s role in the war in his book The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950–
1953.10 Crane and Clodfelter both argue it was the decision to bomb irrigation dams in 
North Korea late in the war that had significant impacts, since it showed both the North 
Koreans and their sympathizers American leaders’ decreasing concern for collateral 
damage and their willingness to take the next step with nuclear weapons. The gradual 
acceptance of collateral damage in the administration’s target selection paralleled its 
desire to end the conflict, and consequently gave more freedom to commanders at the 
operational and tactical levels in the later stages of the war.  
2. Vietnam 
Many of the same issues that confronted political and military leaders in the 
Korean War were again evident during Vietnam. Nowhere was this more evident than in 
the ebb and flow of limitations put on strategic bombing throughout the war. The gap 
between the effects from collateral damage at the strategic and operational levels 
narrowed because of the politicians’ fear of outside Communist intervention and the 
North Vietnamese’s ability to exploit collateral damage incidents in the media. Air 
commanders were not afforded the same freedoms they were in Korea because of the 
immense amount of political oversight at the operational levels.  
Although Vietnam was similar to Korea in the split between North and South, the 
bombing operations over North and South Vietnam were two significantly different 
campaigns with respect to their purpose. The Vietnam bombing campaign was also 
interrupted many times by political leaders and is most remembered by three distinct 
                                                 
9 Stephen T. Hosmer, “Constraints on U.S. Strategy in Third World Conflict,” RAND Corporation 
(1985): 91, http://www.rand.org/ content/dam/rand/pubs/reports/2008/R3208.pdf. 
10 Robert F. Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950–1953, rev. ed. (Washington, DC: Air 
Force History & Museums Program, 1983). 
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operations: Rolling Thunder, Linebacker I, and Linebacker II. Some literature looks at all 
three campaigns throughout the entire span of the war while others concentrate on the 
individual operations.      
In addition to Clodfelter, Zalin Grant and Ronald B. Frankum Jr. both examine 
collateral damage effects during the entire span of the war in their books Over the Beach 
and Like Rolling Thunder: The Air War in Vietnam, 1964–1975.11 John T. Smith looks 
specifically at the bombing of North Vietnam during 1972 in his book The Linebacker 
Raids: The Bombing of North Vietnam, 1972, and Bernard Nalty focuses on the campaign 
in the South in Air War Over South Vietnam 1968–1975.12 All of these authors explore 
the difference between President Johnson’s approach to the bombing of Vietnam and that 
of Richard Nixon and show how the two presidents varied in their concern for the 
potential effects of collateral damage and adjusted their strategies accordingly. These 
books also look at the impact collateral damage had on North Vietnam’s sympathizers—
specifically the Soviet Union and China—and how it impacted each President’s 
reluctance to bomb the North’s industrial capacity and population centers.  
With the growth of mass media after the Korean War, the effects of collateral 
damage started to become more visible to the both citizens of the United States and the 
international community. As a result, the use of propaganda by the enemy increased in 
both amount and effectiveness. Both Grant and Smith point out the different methods 
used by the North Vietnamese to exploit the negative effects from collateral damage and 
the North’s attempts to use propaganda to turn the United States and international 
community against the U.S. war effort. Both authors contend that, although pilots 
actually went to considerable lengths to avoid killing civilians, the North Vietnamese 
were successful in their use of propaganda to negatively affect support for the war in the 
United States. This work builds on that by examining how pilots’ actions at the tactical 
                                                 
11 Zalin Grant, Over the Beach: The Air War in Vietnam (New York: W. W. Norton, 2005); Ronald B. 
Frankum Jr, Like Rolling Thunder: The Air War in Vietnam, 1964–1975 (Lanham, MD: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2005).  
12 John T. Smith, The Linebacker Raids: The Bombing of North Vietnam, 1972 (Wellington House, 
London: Arms & Armour, 1999); Bernard C. Nalty, Air War Over South Vietnam 1968–1975 (Washington, 
DC: Air Force History and Museums Program, 2000). 
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level—even though they were of good intention—affected the strategic and political 
levels of the war.  
The subject of target selection during Vietnam is completely dependent on 
whether one is discussing the bombing of the North or the South. The strategic bombing 
of North Vietnam focused on taking out industrial targets and any other entities that were 
helping the North Vietnamese support the war in the South; the bombing in the South 
consisted mostly of close air support of troops on the ground. The measures taken by 
pilots to support troops in the South is looked upon critically by Nick Turse in his book 
Kill Anything that Moves: The Real American War in Vietnam, which likens the air 
support to the indiscriminate bombing of World War II.13 The difficult process that 
commanders on the ground went through in calling in air strikes with the risk of collateral 
damage is looked at in Dave Grossman’s On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning 
to Kill in War and Society.14   
3. Kosovo  
As the twentieth century drew to a close with the Kosovo conflict, the number of 
collateral damage incidents had decreased exponentially from that of Korea and Vietnam, 
but the effects of each individual incident was increasingly scrutinized. Because of this 
increased visibility, politicians and military leaders placed avoiding collateral damage 
among the highest objectives of the war. No longer was there the mindset of collateral 
damage just being a part of war; now it was something that had to be at the forefront of 
every aircrew’s mind before deciding to drop a bomb.  
Anthony Cordesman dedicates an entire chapter to the impacts of collateral 
damage during Kosovo in his book The Lessons and Non-Lessons of the Air and Missile 
Campaign in Kosovo. Cordesman examines the political sensitivity of collateral damage 
during the conflict and argues that NATO gave more priority to avoiding collateral 
damage than to military effectiveness. Cordesman is critical of U.S. military and political 
                                                 
13 Nick Turse, Kill Anything That Moves: The Real American War in Vietnam (New York: 
Metropolitan Books, 2013). 
14 Dave Grossman, On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society, 
Revised edition (New York: Back Bay Books, 2009).  
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leaders who have given the impression that technological advances in weapons systems 
and aircraft have resulted in wars that can be fought at a near “perfect” level.15 The future 
implication of making these types of assumption will be discussed in the conclusion of 
this paper.  
Cordesman also brings to light the implications of target selection throughout the 
conflict. Similar to Korea and Vietnam, politicians and military leaders’ reluctance to 
bomb certain targets diminished as the conflict progressed. As William Arkin points out 
in his article “Operation Allied Force: ‘The Most Precise Application of Air Power in 
History,’” the potential for collateral damage initially restrained military leaders from 
bombing Belgrade to achieve objectives. Arkin gives an excellent analysis of the 
progression of targeting throughout the bombing campaign and discusses the ebb and 
flow of restrictions as collateral damage incidents occurred.16  
Maintaining the cohesion among the 19 NATO participants—arguably the most 
exploitable vulnerability for Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic—is discussed 
extensively in Paul Gallis’s report to Congress, “Kosovo: Lessons Learned from 
Operation Allied Force” and Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O’Hanlon’s book, Winning 
Ugly: NATO’s War to Save Kosovo.17 Daalder and O’Hanlon contend that there was a 
general consensus among NATO members on the strategic goals for the allies, but there 
were disagreements on the methods to be used and the acceptable amount of risk of 
collateral damage.18  
                                                 
15 Anthony H. Cordesman, The Lessons and Non-Lessons of the Air and Missile Campaign in Kosovo, 
(Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001), 95–137.  
16 William M. Arkin, “Operation Allied Force: ‘The Most Precise Application of Air Power in 
History,’” in War Over Kosovo: Politics and Strategy in a Global Age, ed. Andrew J. Bacevich and Eliot 
A. Cohen (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 1–37. 
17 Paul E. Gallis, “Kosovo: Lessons Learned from Operation Allied Force,” Congressional Research 
Service, Library of Congress, last updated November 19, 1999, http://congresssionalresearch.com/ 
RL30374/document.php; Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly: NATO’s War to Save 
Kosovo (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2000), 118–122. 
18 Ibid. 
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C. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS  
The strategic and political impacts of collateral damage have a very prominent 
role in military strategy. By understanding the strategic and political implications of 
killing enemy non-combatants, or not killing them, one can further the understanding of 
war strategy as a whole and use that knowledge to successfully employ strike warfare in 
future conflicts.  
As politicians’ sensitivity to potential and actual collateral damage resulting from 
strike warfare increased over the second half of the twentieth century, it subsequently 
increased the constraints put on strategic objectives. Factors including the development 
and availability of mass media, the advent of precision guided weapons, and various 
leaders’ vulnerability to international and domestic pressure all played significant roles in 
the evolution of the political and strategic effects of collateral damage over the examined 
time period. The amount of weight each one of these factors held regarding collateral 
damage varied throughout each of the wars studied. As the three case studies show, the 
strategic bombing campaigns progressed from a World War II Armageddon model of 
strike warfare into a model centered on the precise removal of a rogue regime at the end 
of the twentieth century. In turn, it embodied a transformation from the idea that an entire 
society can be implicated in the war effort— and is therefore is a legitimate target—to the 
idea that the society under the government is actually a victim in which case the goal 
should be to harm it as little as possible while still eliminating the people in charge.  
  
 11 
II. THE KOREAN WAR 
Less than five years after the conclusion of World War II, the United States once 
again found itself entrapped in conflict, and though a short amount of time had passed 
since the unconditional surrender of Japan and Germany, the dynamics surrounding the 
Korean War were drastically different. The Korean War was the first in a series of limited 
wars the United States fought throughout the second half the twentieth century in which 
the political objectives and military actions did not always coincide. Because of the 
limited nature of these conflicts, the concern for collateral damage from strike warfare 
and its effects on political and strategic objectives played a critical role in how these wars 
were conducted. During the Korean War, disagreements between political and military 
leaders regarding potential and actual collateral damage from strategic bombardment 
were caused by a number of factors. Among the elements that influenced attitudes toward 
collateral damage were the proximity of the Korean War to World War II, the U.S. 
political leaders’ desire to keep the war limited and avoid Soviet intervention, and 
America’s ability to maintain support from its allies and the entire international 
community as a whole. 
A. PROXIMITY TO WORLD WAR II 
The proximity of the Korean War to the Second World War influenced both 
political and military leaders overseeing the war as well as the aviators who found 
themselves over the skies of Korea. Many of the military leaders who had developed and 
supported the plans to firebomb Tokyo and drop atomic bombs on Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki were once again asked to develop a strategic bombing campaign that would 
somehow cripple the enemy’s war effort. This time however, the context of the war was 
completely different, and military leaders were challenged to adhere to political 
constraints. Throughout the war, three Army generals who were all veterans of World 
War II—Douglas MacArthur, Matthew Ridgeway, and Mark Clark—held the role of both 
commander of Far East Forces and commander in chief of the United Nations command. 
Their experience in the European and Pacific theaters during World War II caused them 
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to have diverse views on the numerous applications and effects of strategic bombing, but 
the stark difference in the political objectives of the two wars produced friction between 
them and policy makers throughout the conflict.  
Perhaps equally important, the leading figures in the U.S. Air Force during the 
Korean War were all World War II veterans who went into Korea believing the air 
campaigns over Germany and Japan had vindicated the efficacy of strategic bombing.19 
Leading up to the Korean War, air planners envisioned a predominantly unrestricted 
bombing campaign and were left frustrated when political constraints, largely due to the 
potential for collateral damage, limited certain strategic decisions on the use of air 
power.20 For officers who fought in World War II with little to no political guidelines on 
bombing, Korea was very different and often produced confusion when they were trying 
to achieve military objectives. 
Moreover, the perceived success of strategic bombing during World War II led 
the air commanders to believe the same tactics would work merely five years later in 
Korea, and although military leaders were not purposely trying to kill civilians during the 
Korean War, a large number of them carried over their belief that sometimes civilians are 
killed because war is a dirty business. Major General Emmett O’Donnell, head of the 
bomber command in Korea, summed up many Air Force leaders’ vision for their 
service’s expected role at the start of the war: “It was my intention and hope that we 
would be able to get out there and … put a severe blow on the North Koreans, with an 
advance warning perhaps, telling them that they had gone too far in what we all 
recognized as being an act of aggression…and [then] go to work burning five major cities 
to the ground, and to destroy completely every one of about eighteen strategic targets.”21 
Political leaders did not share the same view as O’Donnell—at least not at the strategic 
and political level. In the administration’s view, strategic bombardment no longer needed 
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to use all means necessary, which included a high toleration for collateral damage, to 
achieve limited objectives.22  
Although the significant amount of civilian deaths and suffering from World War 
II bombing raids was scrutinized by many observers around the world, U.S. political and 
military leaders—and a significant portion of the United States population—focused on 
the belief that the strategic bombing campaign in Germany and Japan was extremely 
effective in ending the war and preventing further U.S. casualties.23 The politicians’ 
positive assessment of the World War II bombing campaign, which was supported by an 
arguably subjective United States Strategic Bombing Survey that failed to address ethical 
or humanitarian concerns, gave policy makers inflated expectations for the precise use of 
air power in Korea.24  
If a more objective assessment of the bombing campaign over Germany and Japan 
had been done following the Second World War, the lessons may not have been applied 
easily to Korea. Not only was the industry and infrastructure of Korea much different 
than that of Germany and Japan, but also the political climate of the international 
community during World War II permitted indiscriminately destructive military actions 
that would have been scrutinized more critically during the Korean War.25 During World 
War II, the objective of strategic bombing was twofold: to defeat the enemy’s war-
making capability and defeat the civilian populace’s will to continue fighting. Events 
such as the firebombing of Tokyo, which killed thousands of civilians in a matter of 
hours, were thought to play an integral part in achieving the second objective. To this 
must be added an underlying view that the populations of Germany and Japan were 
complicit in the militarism and aggression of their governments, hence morally legitimate 
targets in a war of nations. In Korea, air commanders were still permitted to bomb 
industrial targets that contributed to North Korea’s war efforts, but the concern for 
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reducing collateral damage constrained many of the attacks desired by military leaders.26 
International and American opinion also tended to view the aggression of the North as 
having arisen from ideological forces external to Korea. Precisely because the war was 
viewed as an expression of international communist expansionism, it was not easy to see 
it as a crime organically rooted North Korean society. These differences between the two 
wars drove policy makers to emphasize the importance of avoiding collateral damage at 
the strategic and political level even though many airmen over the skies of Korea were 
still using the same tactics they employed five years earlier.  
B. THE IMPLICATIONS OF LIMITED WAR 
The limited nature of the Korean War was the primary reason why the concern for 
collateral damage played such a significant role at the strategic and political level; the 
relationship between the limits placed on bombing efforts and collateral damage is the 
main focus of this chapter. Although fewer restrictions were enforced at the operational 
and tactical level, it does not discount the reality that the military commanders’ objectives 
were always secondary to the overall policy and considerations of the administration at 
any given time during the conflict. When discussing U.S. strategy in Third World 
conflicts generally, Stephen Hosmer suggests that, “strategies have tended to evolve more 
from what the various administrations believed that the United States dare not or should 
not do than from what the battlefield situation of a particular conflict of crisis might 
optimally require.”27 The administration’s concern for the potential negative 
consequences from expanding the war and creating more collateral damage were evident 
in President Truman’s actions at the beginning of the conflict.   
From the outset of the war, President Truman made it clear to both the 
international community and the American military that the bombing campaigns during 
the Korean War would be conducted in a manner unlike those in the Pacific. Instead of 
unconditional surrender, Washington’s strategic objectives at the start of the war were to 
preserve South Korea’s sovereign territory and avoid Soviet or greater Chinese invention 
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that might trigger a third world war. Within the first five days of the war, Truman 
expressed to the Nation Security Council his commitment to avoid “indiscriminate” 
bombing of North Korea, and on June 30, Truman issued a directive to General George 
Stratemeyer, Commander of Far East Air Forces (FEAF), to only attack “pure military 
targets” in North Korea.28 General Stratemeyer informed his subordinates in the U.S. 
bomber command that they were forbidden to “attack urban areas as targets” but attacks 
on “industrial targets contributing to the combat effort of North Korean forces” were 
approved.29 The language used in initial directives was heavily influenced by political 
considerations and highlighted the importance of avoiding direct attacks on civilians at 
the strategic level, yet it was still subjective enough to allow a certain amount of 
flexibility at the operational and tactical level. A similar compromise had prevailed in the 
Second World War, at least in Europe, where the United States always envisioned its 
strategic bombing campaign as directed against “industrial” rather than “civilian” targets; 
a distinction that proved difficult to enforce at the operational level.  
In addition to the type of targets the administration authorized military to attack, 
the location of these targets was initially restricted as well. The restrictions placed on the 
nature of targets eventually decreased, but the area of operations in which U.S. bombers 
operated was constrained heavily throughout the entire conflict. Although military 
leaders implored Truman to allow them to attack bases beyond the northern border that 
were supplying the enemy, Truman remained persistent in his decision to keep the war 
confined to the peninsula. A significant reason for Truman’s reluctance for expanding the 
war into Manchuria was the fear that bombing Chinese bases would cause enormous 
amounts of collateral damage that the Chinese could exploit to encourage Soviet 
intervention. Moreover, if the decision to use nuclear weapons in Manchuria were 
made—which many military and political leaders thought would be inevitable if the war 
was expanded—it would have only exacerbated the problem of collateral damage and 
increased the probability of Soviet involvement. 
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Another limitation on the bombing campaign was the acceptable methods for 
destroying the enemy’s infrastructure. At the start of the war, FEAF planners thought B-
29s would be most effective in destroying North Korean industrial targets in urban areas 
through the use of incendiary bombs and radar bombing.30 In addition to completely 
destroying the targets themselves, some military leaders believed the use of incendiaries 
may also diminish civilian morale and their willingness to support the communist 
government.31 Both MacArthur and Stratemeyer urged the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to 
allow them to move forward with these attacks, but the plan was deemed unacceptable to 
the JCS which was getting direct pressure from Washington. MacArthur was informed 
that “because of the serious political implications involved … it is desired that you advise 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for clearance with higher authority, of any plans you may have 
before you order or authorize such an attack or attacks of a similar nature.”32 Even with 
these restrictions in place, the strategic bombing campaign was effective in taking out a 
large number of targets without the stigma of indiscriminate bombing. Leading up to the 
Inchon invasion on September 15, 1950, hydroelectric plants and targets in close 
proximity to the border were still off limits because of their politically sensitive nature.33 
In the first four months on the war, the concern for collateral damage was imposing 
constraints at both the strategic and operational level; however, the disparity between the 
concerns for collateral damage at the strategic level and those at the tactical level would 
start to widen with China’s entry into the war in early November.  
By the time the Chinese entered the war—and due largely to MacArthur’s success 
in pushing the North Koreans to the northern border—the Truman administration had 
adjusted its strategic objective from maintaining South Korea’s sovereign territory to 
achieving a unified Korean peninsula. The Chinese offensive caused two additional shifts 
in Truman’s policy. First, it forced the administration to change its strategic objectives 
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once again—this time to securing an armistice that kept the border between the North and 
the South close to its original location. The second shift in policy dealt directly with 
degree of limitations placed on the military, specifically the controls placed on strategic 
bombers. This turning point in the war demonstrated that the political leaders’ acceptance 
of collateral damage as a byproduct of strategic bombing paralleled how high the stakes 
were at any given time. The Chinese offensive in November of 1950 had raised those 
stakes.34  
General MacArthur, undoubtedly surprised by the severity of the Chinese attacks, 
immediately requested to escalate the bombing efforts into Manchuria to cripple the war 
making capacity of the Chinese. Truman and his staff, fearing large numbers of Chinese 
civilian casualties and the threat of Soviet intervention, denied MacArthur’s request to 
expand the bombing campaign beyond the North Korean border.35 Truman still intended 
to have positive control over the possibility for collateral damage at the strategic and 
political level; however, within the borders of Korea, he started to increase his tolerance 
for acceptable bombing methods and suitable locations for bombing attacks.  
General Stratemeyer, using every ounce of leeway given to him as the Far East 
Air Force Commander, authorized the use of incendiaries to counter the Chinese 
offensive and destroy Korean cities thought to be “virtual arsenals and important 
communication centers.”36 Stratemeyer’s instructions to the head of bomber command 
were explicit, if improbable: “Taking care to avoid hospitals, General O’Donnell was 
expected to burn the cities to the ground.”37 On November 5, twenty one B-29 bombers 
dropped 170 tons of incendiaries on the town of Kanggye resulting in over 65 percent of 
the town’s built-up area being destroyed.38 Other incendiary attacks like this followed, 
and by the end of November, at least nine other cities—including ones along the Yalu 
River border with China—had been firebombed. Even with constraints lifted on the 
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methods of attack, General MacArthur emphasized to air commanders to avoid flying 
into Chinese territory and stressed that for political reasons, “the border cannot and must 
not be violated.”39  
In addition to prohibiting planes from crossing the border, the administration still 
kept other strategic limitations in place to overshadow the increased probability of 
collateral damage at the operational and tactical levels. For example, although the 
restriction on the overall use of incendiaries was lifted, their use against the North Korean 
capital was still proscribed, and cities such as Rashin, a critical North Korean port in 
close proximity to the Soviet border, were still off limits to air attacks.40 In Truman and 
the JCS’s view, even with Chinese intervention and the coalition army being driven 
south, the stakes were not high enough to risk the repercussions from hitting those 
politically sensitive targets. For the pilots dropping the bombs, the circumstances were 
different. Many pilots knew there was a good chance the straw-thatched roofs on which 
they were dropping napalm could contain civilians, but they also trusted the intelligence 
reports on the nature of the targets and were ultimately trying to survive each flight and 
contribute to the war effort.41 Like the men dropping bombs over the skies of Tokyo, 
many pilots during the Korean War were not overly concerned whether it was incendiary 
bombs or atomic ones, they were focused on trying to achieve their mission without 
dying rather than worrying about the overall political consequences of their actions.42  
The North Korean response to the U.S. expansion of its bombing effort during 
this time was twofold. At the tactical level, communist forces moved mostly at night to 
avoid being seen by American bombers and used deception by removing a section of a 
railway or bridge during the night to make it appear as if the targets had already been 
struck or were unserviceable.43 Although moving at night seemed viable to the 
communists as a method of avoiding American air power, in reality, it just increased the 
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likelihood of collateral damage because of the reduced visibility for American pilots. At 
the political and strategic level, the North Korean military and government attempted to 
exploit the decrease in constraints to support their propaganda efforts. When restrictions 
were lifted on the use of incendiaries on the North Korean capital in early January, 1951, 
radios throughout Pyongyang reported that “the entire city burned like a furnace for two 
whole days” despite most reports that stated approximately 35 percent of the city’s built 
up area was destroyed.44 Although limited by the insignificant amount of media coverage 
of the war, North Korean officials used other diplomatic channels like the armistice talks 
to express their disapproval with U.S. bombing tactics.  
From the start of armistice negotiations in July 1951 until the end of the war, air 
power was the primary means for both destroying the enemy’s military and forcing a 
settlement that suited American leaders. Since ground operations had come to a virtual 
standstill with each side dug in on opposite sides of the 38th parallel in a fashion similar 
to the First World War, political and military leaders contemplated the best way strategic 
bombing could achieve their political objectives and end the war. Frustrated by the 
strategic bind they found themselves in, U.S. decision makers once again removed 
constraints on U.S. air power in the spring of 1952 by authorizing an “air pressure” 
strategy intended to convince the communists to agree to an armistice. 45  The decrease in 
limitations on air power during this period reduced the gap between concern for collateral 
damage at the strategic and tactical levels hitherto unseen.  
The air pressure campaign in 1952 had more resemblance to Curtis Lemay’s 
strategic bombing campaigns of World War II than the earlier campaigns of the Korean 
War. Brigadier General Jacob Smart, the deputy FEAF Commander, stated, “Whenever 
possible, attacks will be scheduled against targets of military significance so situated that 
their destruction will have a deleterious effect up on the morale of the civilian population 
actively engaged in the logistic support of enemy forces.”46 Air commanders switched 
the emphasis back to destroying targets within the North Korean capital, which had not 
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been bombed for close to a year, and attacked previously forbidden hydroelectric plants 
that supplied power to both North Korea and China.47 The language used by Smart—not 
specifically naming civilians as bombing targets but nonetheless subjective in its 
nature—mirrored that of the administration, which was trying to maintain the moral high 
ground regarding collateral damage while increasing the pressure on communist leaders 
at the strategic and operational levels. 
North Korean leaders saw the increase in bombing efforts as an opportunity to 
step up their propaganda campaign. As armistice talks continued, the chief Communist 
negotiator, North Korean General Nam Il, proclaimed, “In fact it is only by relying on 
indiscriminate and inhuman bombing and bombardment by your Air and Naval Forces in 
violation of the international law that the present positions of your ground forces are 
barely and temporarily maintained.”48 Such statements were meant to draw the attention 
of the international community to the methods used by U.S. bombers and also 
demonstrate the tenacity of the communists regardless of the intensification of U.S. 
bombing efforts.    
At the start of the conflict, to try and refute claims of indiscriminate attacks on 
North Korean cities, U.S. policy makers ordered that prior to any major operations, 
leaflets be dropped warning civilians of impending air attacks. As the war progressed 
however, disparity of views grew between the administration and military leaders on the 
effectiveness of dropping leaflets. What most air commanders thought was a humane 
gesture to the North Korean population was starting to be construed as a potential 
political liability by policy makers. In August 1952, at the height of the air pressure 
campaign, air commanders planned to announce to the press the planned bombing of 78 
North Korean centers. Stressing the likelihood that the communists would use these 
warnings for propaganda purposes, the State Department informed the military to cancel 
the message, which may, in turn, have caused more civilian casualties.49 The debate over 
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whether leaflet drops effectively warned civilians or provided propaganda confirmed the 
discrepancy in perception at the strategic and tactical levels. 
After taking office in 1953, President Eisenhower raised the stakes once again by 
threatening to expand the war to China and considering the use of nuclear weapons.50 In 
addition to the threat of expanding the war outside of Korea, limits were again lifted on 
targets inside the country. Of particular significance was the decision to bomb North 
Korea’s irrigation dams in the spring of 1953, which resulted in extensive amounts of 
flooding throughout the region and the destruction of the vital rice crop used to feed 
much of the North Korean and Chinese populations in the surrounding areas. In order to 
cover themselves at the political level, air commanders emphasized the attacks on the 
dams were inundating the rail system and other key lines of communication rather than 
focusing on the devastation of the rice crop, which could potentially starve the 
population.51 It was an indirect method of threatening the North Korean population that 
did not involve dropping weapons on population centers and was acceptable at both the 
strategic and operational levels.  
Although Eisenhower was still reluctant to expand the war for the same reasons as 
Truman, he took a less cautious approach to break the stagnation in the armistice talks 
and to get U.S. troops home from a war that was losing credibility among the American 
population. The administration’s willingness to use nuclear weapons and its decrease in 
target limitations at the operational and tactical level confirmed the transformation in the 
concern for collateral damage over the course of the war. As the stakes were continuously 
raised throughout the war, both political and military leaders adjusted their strategies to 
deal with the increased possibility of civilian casualties.  
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C. THE IMPACT OF OUTSIDE PRESSURE 
Although the United States had the most at stake militarily, economically, and 
politically out of all the UN countries involved in the Korean war, it still tailored its 
actions heavily to maintain the support of its allies—specifically the United Kingdom. 
Preserving a strong alliance with Western Europe was essential to the United States if the 
Soviet Union decided to enter the war, and it also legitimized the legality and political 
approval for going to war with a nation many people in the Western world knew nothing 
about.52 More generally, the Korean War was viewed from the start as one element in a 
global struggle against communist aggression, and its conduct was always conceived in 
light of that larger, inherently multilateral contest.53 The allies’ influence at the strategic 
and political level accordingly had far greater impacts on the war than their actual 
military support.54 Britain’s concern for the potential consequences of a bombing 
campaign similar to the one they had inflicted on Germany influenced U.S. decision 
making at the strategic level throughout the war. Furthermore, since U.S. objectives in 
Korea were limited, unlike those of World War II, the stakes were simply not high 
enough for policy makers to completely disregard world opinion. 
The reservations felt by President Truman and many political leaders were a 
direct result of the pressure put on them from the international community to avoid the 
same indiscriminate death and destruction bombers caused during the Second World 
War. Leading up to and during the war, media outlets from various countries—including 
nations that were neutral—reminded the world of the tactics used by strategic bombers 
during World War II and questioned whether the same methods were being employed in 
Korea. One Indian newspaper drew special attention from U.S. leaders in the fall of 1950 
for its scathing assessment of the decision to drop atomic weapons on Japan.55 Because 
of articles like these, bombing tactics used during the first few months of the Korean War 
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drew even more attention from outsiders, which put a significant amount of political 
pressure on the administration. U.S. political leaders were continuously trying to balance 
the international community’s perception of the bombing campaign in Korea with 
employing a successful military campaign at the operational and tactical levels.56 
After the Chinese entered the war, U.S. military leaders looked to policy makers 
to reduce a majority of the constraints on air power, yet they were met with resistance 
due largely to pressure being put on the Truman administration from Europe to keep the 
war contained in Korea. The British and the French, already spread thin because of their 
forces in Malaya and Indochina, were weary of expanding the bombing campaign 
(undoubtedly causing more civilian casualties) into Manchuria because of the possibility 
of igniting a third world war—in which case they would need the United States’ 
resources for their defense rather than consumed by a war in Asia.57 When the United 
Nations General Assembly met on December 14, 1950, and adopted a resolution 
supporting a negotiated settlement to end the conflict in Korea, European leaders 
implored the United States to use diplomatic means rather than military escalation to 
resolve the conflict.58  
Although Britain demanded the United States consult with it on major strategic 
moves—particularly those that expanded the bombing efforts—as the war continued and 
the United States found itself as the primary stakeholder, concern for the allies’ approval 
at the operational and strategic level seemed to decrease in parallel. In 1952, when the 
decision was made to bomb the previously forbidden hydroelectric power plants, 
Washington failed to notify Britain of its intentions causing a short-lived degradation in 
relations between the two countries.59 With Eisenhower in office, the administration’s 
apprehension to expand the bombing campaign— including the option to use nuclear 
weapons and their accompanying collateral damage effects—declined significantly. 
Despite the decline, the European allies’ fear that expanding the war would make their 
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territory susceptible to a retaliatory nuclear strike by the Soviet Union was still a primary 
factor restraining Eisenhower.60 As the pressure built to break the stagnation and get 
American troops home during the summer of 1953, Eisenhower concluded that if the an 
atomic offensive was successful “the rifts so caused could, in time, be repaired.”61  
Both Truman and Eisenhower’s substantial regard for collateral damage was 
essential for maintaining the allies’ support and keeping the international community’s 
accusations of an unjust and inhumane war to a minimum. Even with that in mind, 
similar to the gradual decrease in limits placed on U.S. bombing as the war evolved, the 
political leaders’ concern regarding negative impressions of U.S. operations and tactics 
diminished as the stakes were raised by the adversaries. Also significantly important, the 
availability and advancement of media resources at the time reduced the North Koreans’ 
ability to wage the same aggressive and influential propaganda campaign that the North 
Vietnamese did twenty years later.62 The limited amount of coverage on the Korean War 
significantly hampered the world’s ability to see what was occurring below the strategic 
and political levels.  
D. CONCLUSION 
During the Korean conflict, the three main factors discussed in this chapter—the 
proximity to World War II, the limited nature of the war, and the pressure from outside 
entities—all impacted the disparity between collateral damage effects at the strategic 
level versus those at the operational and tactical level. At the strategic level, the potential 
for collateral damage directly imposed restraints such as forbidding airmen to cross the 
North Korean border, restricting the use of incendiaries at the start of the war, and 
preventing pilots from bombing certain industrial targets until much later in the war. 
Conversely, at the operational and tactical levels, many of the pilots executing the 
missions, and many of the military leaders giving them their orders, were far enough 
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away from the flag pole to have some flexibility in the tactics they were using to 
accomplish their mission. Since actions taken at the tactical level, such as the bombing of 
the irrigation dams, were not publicized in the same detail the President and high ranking 
military leaders’ statements were, the concern for collateral damage and the measures 
taken to avoid killing civilians were less of a priority at the lower levels. This in no way 
argues that the U.S. pilots in Korea did not care about the innocent lives of the civilian 
populace, it simply implies that the quest for survival and the desire to accomplish their 
mission made collateral damage a more acceptable byproduct of the war.  
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III. THE VIETNAM WAR 
Many of the lessons learned from the bombing campaign over Korea could have 
been applied to the Vietnam War, but the thought among political and military leaders 
prior to Vietnam centered on the next major war involving the Soviet Union, in which 
case nuclear weapons would dominate air power strategy. Consequently, the relationship 
between collateral damage effects at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels became 
largely obscured since it was assumed that civilian deaths would assuredly be a 
byproduct of nuclear war. To the air planners’ surprise, the United States found itself 
entangled in another limited war with significant political constraints being applied to air 
power that were due largely to collateral damage considerations. As the war unfolded, the 
political leaders responsible for executing the Vietnam bombing operations not only 
cared deeply about the effects of collateral damage, but they also took extensive measures 
to avoid it. After giving a brief background of the war and the three major air campaigns, 
this chapter examines the campaigns over North and South Vietnam separately and 
compares and contrasts some of the same collateral damage considerations seen during 
the Korean War.  
Broadly speaking, two of the primary strategic objectives for the United States 
entering the Vietnam War were to stop the spread of communism, and as a direct result, 
help the South Vietnamese defend themselves from the Northern Communists and 
preserve the South’s independence. Similar to the Korean War, the United States 
attempted to achieve these objectives through a limited military campaign. As the war 
progressed, the primary objective of defeating the North Vietnamese communists slowly 
shifted to implementing Vietnamization, saving the lives of American prisoners of war, 
and somehow attempting to achieve peace with honor, meaning the withdrawal of U.S. 
forces on terms that would allow an independent regime in the South to survive.63  
Although the Johnson and Nixon administrations both oversaw bombing Vietnam 
from 1965 to 1972, they each took different approaches to the strategy and tactics 
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employed. Similar to the gradualist approach implemented in Korea, President Johnson 
and his first Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, engaged in a slow escalation of 
aggression aimed at threatening the North into concessions and establishing an 
independent, non-communist South Vietnam.64 They employed this strategy through 
Operation Rolling Thunder, which lasted from March 2, 1965, to November 1, 1968. 
McNamara imagined that giving the Vietnamese a glimpse of U.S. power, specifically 
from the air campaigns, would cause them to reconsider their attempted takeover of the 
South.65 In Johnson and McNamara’s view, the quick and decisive employment of air 
power would obtain their political objectives without raising the stakes to the point of 
Soviet or Chinese intervention. This strategy became popularly referred to as “enough but 
not too much.”66  
President Nixon took a different approach in his oversight of Operation 
Linebacker I and II, which took place between May and December of 1972. Since the 
landscape of the war had changed significantly since the end of Rolling Thunder, Nixon 
used air power as a tool to achieve his objective of gradually withdrawing American 
troops while keeping the South from completely collapsing.67 Contrary to Johnson’s 
attempt to get the North to see him as someone always willing to negotiate, Nixon wanted 
the North Vietnamese to view him as unpredictable and prepared to go to any lengths to 
end the war on favorable terms.68 At one point, Nixon told his aide H.R. Haldermann, “I 
want the North Vietnamese to believe I’ve reached the point where I might do anything 
to stop the war. We’ll just slip the word to them that, for God’s sake, you know, Nixon is 
obsessed about communism. We can’t restrain him when he’s angry and he has his hand 
on the nuclear button.”69 Although Nixon was known for this type of rhetoric, he was still 
apprehensive about escalating the war for fear of Soviet or Chinese intervention. Nixon 
often used such gestural language to overcome the unmistakable impression that his aim 
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was not to end the war but to leave the war. Regardless of the different strategies of each 
administration, both were concerned with the effects of collateral damage and its 
implications throughout the war.   
A. THE AIR CAMPAIGN IN NORTH VIETNAM 
The strategic goals and objectives of the bombing campaign of North Vietnam 
centered on taking out specific industrial targets and preventing supplies from getting to 
the NVA and Vietcong in the South—all while minimizing civilian casualties. The ways 
and means of executing this strategy was a major point of contention between military 
leaders and the Johnson administration. Many U.S. air commanders were veterans of 
World War II and Korea who believed the objective in the North should be to completely 
destroy any and all of the North’s industrial war-making capacity, regardless of its 
proximity to civilians.70 Although they did not advocate purposely killing Vietnamese 
civilians with air strikes, the military leaders’ acceptable number of civilian casualties 
was much higher than their civilian counterparts. They continuously fought the Johnson 
administration on restricting the location of air strikes and limiting the number of targets 
struck. The disparity in views of the military and political leaders on the proper bombing 
strategy demonstrated the gap between the concern for collateral damage at the political, 
operational, and tactical levels. 
Under the Nixon administration, the relationship between civilian and military 
leaders was more unified. Unlike Johnson, President Nixon gave considerably more 
autonomy to his military leaders, and where Johnson had chastised air commanders for 
being too aggressive, Nixon found them too cautious.71 One of the biggest factors 
restraining Nixon from all-out bombardment of the North, besides outside intrusion, was 
the political repercussion of restarting the bombing campaign after Johnson’s decision to 
halt it in 1968.72 When the bombing did resume over North Vietnam in 1972, the 
handcuffs placed on military leaders and pilots were loosened significantly. In response 
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to his decision to resume the bombing campaign after the North Vietnamese’s 1972 
Easter offensive, Nixon said, “I cannot emphasize too strongly that I have determined 
that we should go for broke…he has gone over the brink, and so should we.”73 As the air 
campaign in the North progressed, one tactic the two administrations differed greatly on 
was targeting.  
Designing a targeting campaign for the North was first assigned to Air Force 
General Curtis Lemay with the help of the Pacific Command Headquarters. Famous for 
his relentless bombing campaign against the Japanese during World War II, Lemay 
assembled a list of 94 targets in the summer of 1964 that encompassed the vital war-
making capacity of the North.74 Unlike the indiscriminate bombing campaign of Japan in 
which Lemay coined the term “bonus damage” to describe the destruction of civilian life 
and property, his initial target plan for Vietnam did not specifically target civilian 
populations.75 Nonetheless, Johnson and McNamara disapproved of the plan and a 
continuous debate over targeting between military and civilian leaders ensued. As a way 
to avoid opposition from military leaders, many strategic and operational decisions 
(including targeting) occurred during Johnson’s Tuesday luncheons, which lacked any 
military representation for much of the Rolling Thunder campaign.76    
The potential effects of collateral damage from bombing urban areas in North 
Vietnam, specifically areas close to Hanoi and Haiphong, was one of the tripwires 
Johnson feared would provoke Chinese or Soviet intervention. The deaths of civilians in 
a country to which the Chinese and the Soviets had offered assistance and de facto 
protection put their own credibility at risk. Additionally, there were Chinese and Soviet 
civilian and military personnel in North Vietnam whose deaths may have ignited 
intervention from the PRC or the USSR.77 To ensure urban areas remained safe from 
American aircraft, Johnson placed a thirty mile restricted area around Hanoi and a ten 
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mile restricted area around Haiphong. Within that, prohibited areas were formed ten 
miles and four miles around each city respectively where no overflight was to occur.78  
Johnson’s advisers feared that mining the Haiphong harbor coupled with striking 
SAM sites and airbases housing Vietnamese aircraft would result in outside involvement; 
therefore, those targets were off limits to American pilots during Rolling Thunder.79 The 
hesitance by Johnson’s administration to destroy these vital targets early in the war had 
enormous strategic repercussions. It permitted the North Vietnamese to build one of the 
most sophisticated and lethal air defense systems of that era, and it allowed supplies from 
the Soviets and Chinese to reach the North Vietnamese through Haiphong harbor.80 
Nixon finally approved mining the harbor in 1972. 
The bombing campaign over North Vietnam during the two Linebacker 
operations attacked many of the same targets taken out during Rolling Thunder because 
of the time given to the North to rebuild them. Unlike Rolling Thunder, bombing during 
the Linebacker operations were persistent rather than gradual, and pilots were less 
restrained politically in defining targets of opportunity. Nixon’s administration was still 
keen on keeping civilian casualties to a minimum, but the handcuffs enforced by Johnson 
were loosened. In contrast to the multiple targeting constraints prescribed by Johnson, 
only two major restrictions were enforced in 1972. First, pilots could not strike any 
targets within 25 to 30 nautical miles of the Chinese boarder; second, any targets within a 
ten mile radius of Hanoi had to be approved by the JCS.81 Nixon’s trust in the JCS to 
manage the prospective collateral damage associated with targets in the North was a huge 
leap from the former administration and still kept civilian casualties reasonably low 
compared to previous wars.82  
Despite careful efforts by both civilian and military leaders to minimize collateral 
damage in the North, it still occurred. This was due largely to civilians’ proximity to the 
                                                 
78 Frankum, Rolling Thunder, 44. 
79 Frankum, Rolling Thunder, 31.  
80 Grant, Over the Beach, 14. 
81 Clodfelter, Limits of Air Power, 163. 
82 Ibid., 164.. 
 32 
fixed targets being struck rather than American pilots bombing heavily populated areas. 
Before laser guided munitions entered the war in 1972, it was inevitable that bombs were 
not always going to directly hit the target, especially with the inaccuracies of the B-52 
bombing system. Military leaders seemed to accept this reality much better than their 
political counterparts. In response to McNamara’s bombing restrictions, Admiral Grant 
Sharp, commander of U.S. forces in the Pacific, claimed, “This war is dirty business, like 
all wars. We need to get hardheaded about it…When Hanoi complains about civilians 
being killed, is it not possible to say, ‘Perhaps some were killed, we tried to avoid that, 
but this is a war and some civilians are bound to get killed.’”83 To Sharp’s dismay, 
political pressure and the American public’s growing discontent with the war prevented 
Johnson and his advisers from aligning their views with military leaders.  
The strategic and political effects of collateral damage during the Vietnam War 
had a direct impact on the methods of employment at the tactical level unseen in the 
Korean War. To try and reduce the collateral damage resulting from the B-52’s 
inaccurate bombing system, military leaders were instructed to design bombing routes 
that avoided or minimized collateral damage by restricting final attack headings of the 
aircraft. Bombers flew the same routes each time and attacked targets from the same 
direction.84 This tactic to avoid collateral damage proved disastrous since it allowed the 
North Vietnamese to predict the flight path of incoming B-52s and react accordingly with 
surface-to-air missiles and guns. The result was fifteen B-52s lost and nine severely 
damaged during the eleven days of Linebacker II operations.85  
During Rolling Thunder, the CIA estimated 200 thousand tons of bombs caused 
29,600 civilian casualties.86 The North Vietnamese estimated that 1300 civilians around 
Hanoi and 300 civilians around Haiphong were killed during the Linebacker raids.87 On 
the surface these numbers may seem like a lot, but when compared to previous air 
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campaigns of the twentieth century, the collateral damage from air warfare in Vietnam 
was low. American B-29 bombers killed more than 83,000 civilians in one night during 
the Tokyo bombing campaign.88 Even critics of the war such as American jurist Telford 
Taylor, a prosecutor at the Nuremburg Trials, conceded that the bombing campaign was 
not aimed at killing civilians. After visiting Hanoi following the Linebacker II raids 
Taylor wrote, “Despite the enormous weight of bombs that were dropped, I rapidly 
became convinced that we were making no effort to destroy Hanoi.”89 To this extent, at 
least, civilian deaths in North Vietnam were genuinely “collateral,” rather than part of an 
effort to degrade the enemy’s morale by killing his population. Perception played a 
pivotal role though, and not everyone—including much of the American public—held the 
same view as Taylor. This anti-war sentiment was a U.S. vulnerability the North 
Vietnamese knew they could exploit politically, and it was one of many ways they 
responded to the air campaign in the North.  
The North Vietnamese response to the bombing of their territory was something 
the United States both miscalculated and underestimated. Days before Operation Rolling 
Thunder started, the North Vietnamese started preparing for the destruction of their 
homeland. Expecting nothing short of the atrocious bombing campaign the U.S. imposed 
on Japanese cities during World War II, the Central Committee of the Communist Party 
prepared their citizens for the total destruction of Hanoi and Haiphong.90 
Two days before the bombing campaign of the North began in 1965, North 
Vietnamese leadership started evacuating civilians from Hanoi and Haiphong with 
priority given to women and children not directly involved in the war effort.91 By the end 
of 1967, the population of Hanoi was reduced from 600,000 to less than 400,000 while 
Haiphong’s population had dropped from 400,000 to 250,000.92 In addition to evacuating 
their citizens, the North Vietnamese built massive quantities of bomb shelters to prepare 
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for what they thought was going to be an indiscriminate and ruthless bombing campaign 
by the Americans. It was estimated that close to 21 million bomb shelters were built in 
North Vietnam with the goal of a three to one ratio of shelters to citizens.93 The motto of 
the North Vietnamese became “The bomb shelter is your second home.”94 In conjunction 
with air-raid sirens alerting civilians of impeding attacks, the bomb shelters became a 
routine part of North Vietnamese daily life. Civilians became proficient at discerning 
when it was imperative they take shelter and when they had a few extra minutes to 
continue repairing their war-damaged territory.95  
As a result of the administrations’ concern for collateral damage, U.S. bombers 
were heavily restricted from hitting high value structures within the confines of Hanoi 
and Haiphong. Ironically though, the North Vietnamese essentially solved much of the 
collateral damage problem for the United States by evacuating civilians and building 
shelters. This misunderstanding and miscalculation of the other side’s intentions heavily 
favored the North Vietnamese since they were able to maintain their vital industrial 
structures and still exploit collateral damage that occurred despite U.S. efforts to avoid it.   
Once the North Vietnamese realized they could survive the bombing onslaught by 
the United States, they took pride in their strategy of endurance and used both the attacks 
and the collateral damage effects to bolster support both internally and externally. Even 
during the relentless eleven day bombing campaign of Linebacker II at the end of 1972, 
North Vietnamese leadership was prepared to accept further bombing rather than give 
into American demands.96 They viewed the war as a military one on the battlefield, and a 
political one in the South. Le Duc Tho, the head of the Vietnamese Communist Party, 
stated, “We can only win at the conference table what we have won on the battlefield.”97 
The North’s long-term strategy had one other aspect working for it toward the end of 
1972—the U.S. Congress and American public’s distaste for continuing the war.  
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Throughout the war, the North Vietnamese used propaganda as a precise weapon 
and fine-tuned their skills employing it the same way they had done with their surface-to-
air systems. Movie stars and journalists who sympathized with the North were given 
access to the country while objective reporters were kept out.98 Harrison Salisbury, a New 
York Times reporter, was invited by the North Vietnamese in late 1966 to report on the 
damage in North Vietnam caused by American bombers. Salisbury, to the North’s 
dismay, was actually quite surprised at the low number of civilian casualties in urban 
areas and was more astonished by the United States’ targeting priorities. Nonetheless, 
since the majority of the American public was ill informed on the bombing campaign and 
thought U.S. planes were striking targets without incurring any civilian casualties, 
Salisbury’s reporting had the effect on the American public the North Vietnamese were 
hoping for. Soon after Salisbury’s articles appeared in U.S. newspapers, a debate on the 
legitimacy of the U.S. air campaign began and anti-war sentiment increased 
exponentially.99  
Moreover, the political oversight at the operational and tactical levels remained 
strong because of the American public’s backlash regarding the morality of the bombing 
campaign. The North Vietnamese had not only avoided more civilian casualties in their 
major cities than they had originally expected, but they also successfully used the 
negative effects of collateral damage against the Americans. To the North Vietnamese 
leaders, the number of civilian deaths was “acceptable” considering the propaganda it 
provided and the subsequent restraints it put on the American bombing campaigns. 
B. THE AIR CAMPAIGN IN SOUTH VIETNAM 
Whereas the bombing campaign over North Vietnam centered on destroying 
specific targets and avenues for getting supplies to the South, the bombers over South 
Vietnam focused on supplementing ground troops through Close Air Support (CAS) and 
eliminating the Vietcong. By supporting both South Vietnamese troops on the ground and 
working hand in hand with South Vietnamese air commanders, U.S. forces hoped to 
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boost morale in the South, keep political cohesion intact, and save the South Vietnamese 
citizens from an enemy they both feared and hated.100 Similar to the bombing campaign 
in the North, matching these political goals with military objectives was challenging and 
avoiding collateral damage became even more difficult in the South. Since avoiding 
civilian casualties was more challenging, actions at the tactical level had more direct and 
immediate impacts on the political and strategic level.     
Military and political leaders met in January 1966 to ensure the political and 
military goals for the air war over South Vietnam coincided. They agreed on four 
objectives for the campaign’s future: make it challenging and expensive for the North to 
get supplies to the South, preserve South Vietnamese territory by driving the enemy from 
their bases of operation, eliminate the Viet Cong south of the 17th parallel, and continue 
to deter Chinese intervention or eliminate Chinese troops if China blatantly entered the 
war.101 Early in the war, these objectives were coupled with General William 
Westmoreland’s war of attrition strategy; however, it became apparent very quickly that 
the enemy’s will to fight proved Westmoreland’s strategy both ineffective and costly for 
the United States.102  
Another problem with the attrition strategy was finding the enemy among the 
South Vietnamese population and then eliminating them without killing innocent 
bystanders. Until the North Vietnamese engaged in a more conventional approach in 
1972 with the Easter offensive, the enemy fought the war in the South using hit and run 
tactics dispersing themselves throughout South Vietnamese villages. This not only made 
it difficult for troops on the ground to avoid collateral damage, but also for the pilots 
attempting to strike targets and support ground forces from 20,000 feet above them. This 
discretion was particularly challenging when it came to choosing legitimate targets.  
Targets in the South included enemy troop concentrations, convoys, and supply 
routes, but when the enemy integrated themselves into South Vietnamese villages, the 
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target list expanded to ensure the enemy was removed from their strongholds. By the 
middle of 1966, hospitals, temples, and schools had become military targets because they 
were being used as bases by the enemy.103 In rural areas, military leaders considered 
sparsely constructed mud huts military targets since they often housed the Vietcong.104 
Since many targets in the South were in close proximity to both civilians and friendly 
forces, certain rules of engagement were put in place to try and minimize collateral 
damage.  
Despite the time critical nature of responding to ground forces taking enemy fire, 
South Vietnamese commanders and their American counterparts had to agree on the 
targets before air strikes could take place in the South. Furthermore, before conducting 
planned strikes on NVA and VC bases, aircraft were used to warn South Vietnamese 
civilians of the impending strikes by dropping leaflets and encouraging them to leave the 
area via loud speaker. Tear gas and direct fire weapons were given priority if the 
battlefield encompassed large civilian populations so that collateral damage could be 
minimized.105  
Even with rules of engagement in place to reduce collateral damage, the 
assimilation of the enemy and the South Vietnamese population resulted in unintended 
civilian casualties. Contrary to evacuating citizens in the North to prepare for air strikes, 
the enemy was now purposely integrating itself among the South Vietnamese citizens to 
force the United States and its allies to risk collateral damage to achieve objectives. In the 
battle to regain Ben Tre after the 1968 Tet Offensive, it was estimated that close to 500 
non-combatants were killed—more than the number of soldiers killed.106 Because the 
enemy was using a town filled with innocent civilians as a base for operations, Ben Tre 
transformed itself into a battlefield without the permission of the people living there. The 
mismatch of ends, ways, and means in the South became evident when an anonymous 
U.S. army major speaking about Ben Tre claimed, “It became necessary to destroy the 
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town in order to save it.”107 It brought into question, to the delight of the North 
Vietnamese, whether the United States could retain the support and political cohesion of 
the South Vietnamese while it was destroying massive amounts of their territory with air 
strikes.108 It also demonstrated the decreasing disparity between actions at the operational 
level and their impact at the political level.   
Ben Tre was just one of many villages that became a battlefield for the NVA and 
VC. In Quang Tri, the northernmost province in South Vietnam, it was estimated that 
only eleven of the 3,500 villages avoided being struck during the war.109 When friendly 
villages were overrun by the enemy, tactical decisions often clashed with overall 
objectives. Commenting on the decision to strike villages which had been taken over by 
the enemy, one Air Force officer said, “When we are in a bind like we were [here,] we 
unload on the whole area to try to save the situation. We usually kill more women and 
kids than we do Vietcong but the government troops just aren’t available to clean out the 
villages so this is the only answer.”110 The pressure to support ground troops and the 
urgency to prevent enemy forces from seizing more territory often resulted in blanket 
clearances by South Vietnamese air commanders to bomb large areas and blurred the 
rules of engagement. Furthermore, since pilots often were concerned only with saving the 
lives of their brethren on the ground, they often employed weapons without thinking 
about the collateral damage repercussions at the strategic and political levels.   
The enemy’s response to the bombing campaign in South Vietnam mirrored that 
of the North in many ways, but differences in how the war was fought in the South 
offered the North Vietnamese additional ways to exploit the effects of collateral damage. 
By mixing themselves into the general population and turning normal cities and villages 
into battlegrounds, the North Vietnamese were able to negatively affect both U.S. and 
South Vietnamese morale. The South Vietnamese commanders were calling in air strikes 
on their own citizens—and in some cases their own family and friends—resulting in the 
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destruction of their homeland, while the United States was often forced to attack 
populations known to have women and children in order to protect troops on the ground. 
Furthermore, confiscated documents later revealed that during the North’s spring 
offensive of 1968, North Vietnamese troops employed rocket attacks near civilian 
populations with the sole purpose of provoking a U.S. response that would cause 
collateral damage.111 By inducing these responses, the North Vietnamese were forcing 
the United States to take tactical actions that would have strategic and political impacts.   
The guerilla warfare employed by the Vietcong in response to the conventional 
battle being fought by the United States aided the North’s political objectives in the 
South. By assimilating with the South’s population, the NVA and Vietcong were able to 
simultaneously fight the enemy and exploit the damage caused by American forces to 
turn South Vietnamese citizens against their own government. In villages where 
bombings transformed civilians into refugees in the blink of an eye, the Vietcong 
convinced many citizens including women and children to fight for the other side. 
Although the South Vietnamese did not rally to the communists completely, the 
population was certainly weary and discouraged at the end, which eventually helped lead 
the NVA to victory.  
In turn, the civilians the United States and its allies protected one week could take 
up arms against them the next after being exposed to the North’s propaganda. After 
civilians were persuaded to fight for the Vietcong, U.S. and South Vietnamese troops 
were again faced with the decision to kill what often appeared to be innocent women and 
children. In a personal interview, Troung “Mealy,” a former Vietcong agent in the 
Mekong Delta, stated, “Children were trained … to throw grenades , not only for the 
terror factor, but so the government or American soldiers would have to shoot them. Then 
the Americans feel very ashamed. And they blame themselves and call their soldiers war 
criminals.”112 This tactic worked against the American public, and it also attempted to 
persuade the rest of the international community to sympathize with the North 
Vietnamese. Although by the end of the war international sympathy for the North 
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Vietnamese was not all that great, these tactics provided potential negativity toward the 
American war effort and added pressure to U.S. policy makers.      
Propaganda was particularly effective with the Chinese and the Soviets who did 
not need much convincing to support the North Vietnamese war effort in the first place. 
In a bipolar world where the United States and the Soviet Union had become the lone 
superpowers, it was not hard for communist sympathizers to support the underdog, 
especially when encouraged by propaganda showing the killing of “innocent” civilians in 
the South. The North Vietnamese boasted after the war how they had successfully used 
propaganda to encourage anti-war sentiment and help their goal of removing U.S. 
soldiers from their territory.113 In the South, the enemy’s use of propaganda was a 
deliberate tactic to exploit the negative effects of collateral damage, and it provided 
another example of how the United States miscalculated the North Vietnamese’s 
determination to achieve victory.   
C. CONCLUSION 
By the end of the twentieth century, avoiding or minimizing collateral damage 
was at the forefront of every political and military leader’s mind. The air campaigns 
during the Vietnam War were the significant starting points for this evolution of thought 
because of civilian and military leaders’ genuine concern for collateral damage’s 
implications. Notched in between the indiscriminate bombing campaigns of World War II 
and the current day tactics that rely extensively on GPS guided weapons, Vietnam 
provided concrete examples of how the effects from collateral damage politically and 
militarily impacted U.S. strategy. 
The potential effects of collateral damage during Vietnam forced U.S. decision 
makers to adjust their tactics and strategy throughout the war. It also tightened the 
relationship between collateral damage effects at the strategic, operational, and tactical 
levels. This more closely intertwined relationship was more exaggerated than the Korean 
War in which collateral damage largely only influenced major strategic decisions such as 
border incursions rather than strict operational oversight. Fearing that bombing 
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populations close to Hanoi and Haiphong would provoke outside intervention, the 
Johnson administration severely restricted targets around North Vietnam’s major 
population centers and its main harbor. This allowed supplies to flow freely into the 
North and subsequently down to the Vietcong in the South; it also allowed the North to 
build a complex surface-to-air defense system that wreaked havoc on U.S. pilots 
throughout the war.  
The prospect of collateral damage from the Vietnamese side resulted in 
unparalleled preparation for World War II style bombing. Not realizing North 
Vietnamese leaders had solved much of the problem for them, U.S. policy makers acted 
cautiously and left many vital targets standing until the 1972 counter to the North’s 
Easter offensive. At that point, U.S. strategy had shifted to Vietnamization and the 
continued drawdown of American troops. Over the course of the entire war, the prospects 
of collateral damage had profound impacts on strategy and policy for both sides.  
The United States failed to look extensively at the effects of collateral damage 
from a strategic perspective and instead focused on the consequences from a 
humanitarian standpoint. Political and military leaders adjusted their tactics from their 
World War II roots to minimize civilian casualties, but they underestimated the tenacity 
of the North Vietnamese to use whatever means necessary to outlast the American war 
effort. For the North Vietnamese, exploiting the negative effects of collateral damage 
coincided with their military, political, and strategic objectives of the war. For U.S. 
leaders, collateral damage effects were a microcosm of the no-win situation they found 
themselves in from the war’s start. 
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IV. THE KOSOVO CONFLICT 
The time that elapsed time between the end of the American War in Vietnam in 
1973 and NATO’s intervention in Kosovo in 1999 produced significant improvements in 
both U.S. military capabilities and global communications. Yet even with these important 
developments, there were still common threads linking OPERATION ALLIED FORCE 
in Kosovo to the bombing campaigns over Korea and Vietnam, and some of the same 
factors that impacted collateral damage concerns in those conflicts were apparent again in 
Serbia and Kosovo. Two elements that largely influenced the concern for potential and 
actual collateral damage during Kosovo were the limited nature of the war and the U.S. 
ability to maintain NATO’s cohesion throughout the conflict. Within these two elements, 
factors such as improvements in weapons capabilities and the speed at which information 
could be disseminated worldwide played critical roles in political and military leaders’ 
attempts to deal with the political and strategic effects of collateral damage. The advances 
in technology leading up to the bombing campaign in Kosovo decreased the disparity 
between collateral damage effects at the strategic level and those at the operational and 
tactical level previously unseen during Korea and Vietnam.  
A. NEW LIMITS AND NEW CHALLENGES  
Although advances in technology and communications distinguished the Kosovo 
conflict from Korea and Vietnam, there were still many similarities among the three wars 
that had direct impacts on the bombing campaigns and collateral damage considerations. 
With Kosovo, the United States was once again engaged in a conflict with limited 
political and strategic objectives that had many critics questioning if the conflict was a 
vital American interest. The report for Congress on the lessons learned from 
OPERATION ALLIED FORCE states that “NATO had limited political objectives in the 
conflict, most of which were at least partially met. Key considerations, such as avoiding 
civilian casualties and losses to NATO forces, affected the design of the military strategy 
supporting these objectives.”114 Concerns for collateral damage and the measures 
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implemented to mitigate civilian casualties were certainly not new concepts, but the 
pressure to avoid collateral damage in Kosovo was greater than any other conflict up to 
that point because of advances in technology.115 In addition, the stakes in Kosovo were 
smaller for the United States than in Korea and Vietnam. Whereas the Korean and 
Vietnam wars were framed by a global ideological struggle, Kosovo was an intervention 
against a “rogue”; in turn, there was more emphasis on not harming the victims of the 
rogue regime.     
The gradualist approach to the bombing campaign was another characteristic that 
OPERATION ALLIED FORCE shared with Korea and Vietnam. Collateral damage 
concerns affected directly the hesitation to use overwhelming and decisive force from the 
beginning of the conflict. Gradual escalation was perhaps easier for the public to accept 
and thus was politically more acceptable. Also consistent with Korea and Vietnam, as the 
conflict perpetuated and bombing efforts increased, the list of acceptable targets grew. 
Unlike previous conflicts, however, the amount of collateral damage did not increase 
because of constraints being lifted on targets. This positive result was due partly to the 
advance in weapons systems that will be discussed later, but it was also a result of the 
close connection between actions at the tactical level and their subsequent strategic 
implications.         
Though the bombing campaigns of Kosovo, Korea, and Vietnam resembled each 
other in many aspects, there were also some stark differences that impacted the effects of 
collateral damage. Most obvious, NATO relied on air power as the only military means to 
achieve the stated objectives, which subsequently exposed particular strengths and 
weaknesses in a strategy that was based solely on air power alone.116 The air power only 
approach meant there was no threat to U.S. or allied ground forces, but it also meant that 
each mission conducted by NATO aircraft was examined under a microscope. 
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Since there were no NATO ground forces employed into Kosovo during 
OPERATION ALLIED FORCE, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) was the only 
ground force fighting against the Serbs. Consequently, the mission of close air support—
and the associated potential for collateral damage—both decreased. NATO aircraft still 
supported the KLA by bombing tactical targets such as tanks and military personnel, but 
coordination between troops on the ground and pilots overhead did not match the level 
seen during Korea and Vietnam. The absence of NATO ground troops mitigated some of 
the ROE concerns relating to close air support seen in previous conflicts, but other 
constraints on ROE because of the fear of collateral damage seemed to more than make 
up for it. 
Throughout the conflict, NATO leaders were constantly preoccupied with taking 
whatever measures necessary to avoid civilian casualties. Major General Charles Wald, 
the deputy director of strategic planning for the Joint Staff, described the ROE for the 
bombing campaign “as strict as I’ve seen in my 27 years in the military.”117 The 
meticulous oversight of civilian leaders, specifically regarding targets classified as 
politically sensitive, approached levels unobserved since President Lyndon Johnson 
scrutinized targets lists during the Vietnam War.118 Ramifications felt by political leaders 
because of incidents of collateral damage resulted in immediate adjustments to ROE at 
the operational and tactical levels. Instead of looking at each incident within the larger 
context of the war, politicians demanded that their military commanders modify the ROE 
to meet strategic objectives.119 The ROE adjustments produced modifications in the types 
of weapons authorized, the acceptable methods of attack, and target identification 
procedures.  
One amendment to the ROE that received a substantial amount of attention was 
the decision to allow pilots to descend below 15,000 feet for attacks in order to reduce the 
risk of collateral damage. The rationale for keeping pilots above 15,000 feet was to keep 
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them out of range of Serbian anti-aircraft artillery and man portable anti-aircraft missiles 
that were largely ineffective at targeting aircraft at medium altitudes. Some scholars have 
argued that NATO’s decision initially to restrict pilots to operating above 15,000 feet was 
a direct contributing factor to collateral damage. These assertions are speculative and 
show a lack of understanding of the aircrafts’ weapons systems and tactical capabilities. 
Some critics such as Edward Luttwak, have referred to the medium altitude used by 
NATO aircraft as “ultra-safe” which completely ignores the reality that Serbia 
possessed—and employed—radar guided surface-to-air missiles with ranges upward of 
40,000 feet.120  
After hearing numerous people criticize the directive to restrict aircraft above 
15,000 feet, many Air Force officers came to the defense of NATO leaders by 
endeavoring to educate the general public that in most cases—specifically with precision 
guided munition—employing weapons from medium altitudes is actually more, not less 
accurate.121 Despite the Air Force officers’ attempts to inform both the general public 
and the policy makers, the ROE was amended to give pilots the option to descend to 
lower altitudes after two collateral damage incidents in early April caused major political 
backlash.122 This modification to the ROE was largely a reaction to political 
repercussions and not a direct order for pilots to fly below 15,000 feet for employment. 
Other amendments to the ROE because of outside criticism and concern for collateral 
damage were the prohibition of cluster munitions by the United States after May 7, and a 
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restriction on attacking lines of communication during hours when civilians could 
potentially be in the immediate area.123  
Compared to previous conflicts, the actual amount of civilian casualties from 
bombing during the 78 day campaign was astonishingly low. The most agreed upon 
number for the total amount of civilian casualties for the war is around 500, with a large 
portion of those deaths resulting from a small number of attacks.124 The first week of the 
operation resulted in only a single civilian casualty, yet General Wesley Clark, NATO’s 
Supreme Allied Commander Europe, spent much of the time reassuring allied militaries 
and policy makers that measures were in place to ensure collateral damage was being 
avoided.125 In his first press conference after the start of the campaign, General Clark 
stated, “We are taking all possible measures to minimize collateral damage or damage to 
innocent civilians or nearby property that is not associated with the target.”126  
The substantially low number of civilian casualties at the beginning of the conflict 
was also consistent with the gradualist approach to the bombing campaign. The number 
of sorties flown in the first week was significantly lower than later portions of the war. 
Another reason for the small amount of collateral damage during the initial phase of 
operations was that of precision guided weapons accounting for all the drops.127 The 
employment of these weapons was both a blessing and a curse for U.S. forces throughout 
the conflict. 
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The use of stealth technology, significant increases in the use of laser guided and 
GPS guided weapons, and a much more robust and sophisticated command and control 
systems were all advances that were absent in the Korean and Vietnam wars. One would 
think that the increase in capabilities due to advanced technology would align perfectly 
with the limited aims of NATO and its attempt to reduce the effects of collateral damage, 
but in many cases, it simply raised expectations to an unrealistic level.128 In particular, 
the availability and use of precision guided weapons gave both domestic and international 
audiences the false impression that the United States and NATO were capable of what 
Cordesman refers to as a “perfect” and “bloodless” war.129 Most likely unbeknownst to 
them at the time, U.S. policy makers and military leaders were contributing to the 
impracticable expectations of air power by overtly celebrating the weapons’ success.130 
With this in mind, it is easy for one to see how actions taken at the operational and 
tactical levels had immediate strategic and political consequences. 
The United States often concentrated its efforts on exposing the falsities of the 
enemy’s propaganda campaigns, yet U.S. leaders were just as guilty of bending the facts 
in ways that harmed overall objectives. Although NATO officials did not completely 
discount the possibility of collateral damage, many of the briefings and weapons system 
video supported the commanders’ assertions that bombing efforts were being conducted 
in a nearly perfect manner. The statements made by political and military leaders 
concerning the accuracy of the weapons being delivered were truthful, but they were 
carefully tailored in a way that gave anyone not intimately familiar with the bombing 
campaign the impression that every weapon being employed was going to result in a 
direct hit.131  
A further complication was that the policy makers’ definition of accuracy was 
based seemingly more on the political sensitivity of incidents rather than how close the 
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bombs actually came to hitting the desired impact point. Due to their subjective reporting 
of the bombing campaign, U.S. officials mislead many outside observers by not 
separating avoidable mistakes from the inevitable repercussions of war. If the United 
States and NATO would have taken a more open and objective stance on the reporting of 
collateral damage, it can be argued that it would have given NATO more credibility. 
Since the efficiency of the air war was unprecedented to begin with, American candor 
may have exposed Serbian propaganda for what it was. Objective reporting could 
potentially have set a more realistic standard for politicians regarding their expectations 
for air power in future conflicts.132 
Despite the attention given to laser and GPS guided weapons, only a third of the 
bombs dropped during OPERATION ALLIED FORCE were precision-guided munitions, 
and the majority of them were employed in the first weeks of the campaign.133 Consistent 
with previous conflicts, as the stakes were raised and the urgency to end the conflict 
grew, the restrictions on attacks decreased. The acceptance of unguided munitions as a 
viable method of attack did not however, increase the amount of collateral damage. Two 
collateral damage incidents in mid-April that received a significant amount of criticism—
an attack on a bridge that struck a train carrying civilians and the bombing of a 
misidentified civilian convoy—were both conducted using precision-guided 
munitions.134 The most publicized incident of collateral damage, the accidental bombing 
of the Chinese embassy in May 1999, was also struck using precision-guided weapons.135 
The reality that three of the most highly visible collateral damage incidents all involved 
precision-guided weapons demonstrates clearly that advances in technology did not 
produce a perfect bombing campaign, it only raised expectations to unrealistic levels and 
misguided the general public on the realities of war. 
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Moreover, NATO’s expectations of little to no collateral damage and its impact 
on the international media must not be ignored. Since military and political leaders gave 
impressions of a near perfect campaign—which subsequently discredited the normal 
friction of war as the cause of errors—each occurrence of collateral damage, no matter 
how big or small, became front page news both domestically, and especially abroad. If 
the international media was under the impression that zero to few civilian deaths was the 
standard by which strategic success was being measured, they were happy to question 
any collateral damage incidents that challenged that assumption. Additionally, the media 
often omitted factors such as bad weather and weapon malfunctions that contributed 
factors to collateral damage and instead concentrated solely on the macro level 
implications.136 This subsequently put doubts into the minds of outside observers who 
were previously convinced of the bombing campaign’s efficacy and also fueled the 
Serbian propaganda machine.137 
Milosevic used the high standard set by NATO regarding collateral damage to 
exploit each incident where civilian casualties occurred and discredit claims that strict 
limitations were being enforced on NATO bombers to avoid killing noncombatants. 
Much like the North Vietnamese during the Vietnam War, Milosevic and his followers 
engaged in a complex and persuasive propaganda campaign that attempted to maximize 
the propaganda value of each occurrence of collateral damage. A distinct advantage the 
Serbians had over the North Vietnamese, however, was the speed at which information 
traveled around the globe. The ability to produce near real time images of bomb damage 
made each case of collateral damage increasingly more politically sensitive, which 
consequently had major strategic implications.138 From the start of the campaign until the 
last bomb was dropped, Serbia used the Internet, state-run media, and Serbian expatriates 
to fuel its propaganda efforts and challenge U.S. assertions that it was doing everything 
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possible to limit collateral damage. On the first day of air strikes, they already had started 
claiming that innocent civilians had been killed.139    
As the war progressed, Serbia found creative ways to manipulate the media’s 
coverage of collateral damage. Often times military vehicles and combat casualties were 
removed from collateral damage scenes to make reports appear that the only casualties to 
occur were civilian. In other instances debris was trucked in to make the “scene” appear 
much worse, and bodies were positioned in a way to increase the dramatic effect. Serbian 
television was especially prone to modifying the battlefield for propaganda purposes. The 
Serbian media blatantly deceived their viewers by reporting on incidents well after they 
had happened, using the same baby doll in different locations for humanitarian effects 
and creating scenes that did not coincide with the physical damage around them.140  
In the Kosovo conflict, the United States and NATO encountered a political and 
strategic climate in which the media’s uninhibited ability to report on collateral damage 
had significantly improved since Vietnam and Korea. Although the limited nature of the 
conflict heavily constrained military and political leaders at the strategic and operational 
levels, the conflict demonstrated that regardless of the limits imposed, minimizing 
collateral damage was still a critical element of modern strike warfare and tactical 
mistakes had immediate strategic consequences. 
B. MAINTAINING THE ALLIANCE’S COHESION   
If one were to determine a single vulnerability of OPERATION ALLIED FORCE 
throughout the conflict it would certainly be the cohesion among NATO members. Like 
the Korean War, the United States bore the major share of the political, economic, and 
military burden among all NATO countries involved and therefore dedicated a significant 
amount of time and resources to maintaining support domestically, internationally, and 
within the 19 members that contributed to the operation. Keeping collateral damage at an 
acceptable level for all the allied participants was a continuous challenge for political and 
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military leaders and was essential for keeping a united front against Milosevic and his 
supporters. Two key elements that tested NATO’s unity throughout the conflict were 
reaching a consensus on targeting and denying Milosevic the ability to use propaganda to 
exploit NATO’s cohesion and disrupt international support. Managing the effects from 
collateral damage at both the strategic and tactical level played a critical role in NATO’s 
attempts to achieve its overall objectives.  
From the outset of the war, there were disagreements among both NATO 
members and U.S. military leaders on which targets were the most lucrative for getting 
Milosevic to capitulate. Prior to the campaign, NATO had come up with more than 40 
different iterations of the air campaign.141 Although there was a general consensus 
among members on how the war should be fought at the strategic level, the issue of 
collateral damage prompted many disagreements on which targets were acceptable to 
attack, and which ones should be off limits—at least until there could be an assessment 
made of the effectiveness of the initial attacks.142 Lt. General Michael Short, the air 
commander during the war, was one of the biggest critics of the gradualist approach to 
the campaign. Testifying to Congress after the war, General Short exclaimed, “I’d have 
gone for the head of the snake on the first night…I’d have turned the lights out…dropped 
the bridges across the Danube…hit five or six political-military headquarters in 
downtown Belgrade.” According to Short, “Milosevic and his cronies would have woken 
up the first morning asking what the hell was going on.”143 Unfortunately for Short, the 
political climate and the risk of large amounts of collateral damage did not allow for a 
decisive and overwhelming application of air power from the start—a caution he could 
have surmised from Korea and Vietnam.  
For the planners and executors of the air campaign, the political sensitivity 
component of targeting was the dominant factor when deciding what could and should be 
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destroyed.144 General Henry Shelton, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, defended the 
target selection process by assuring that every target was “looked at in terms of [its] 
military significance in relation to collateral damage or the unintended consequences that 
might be there. Then every precaution [was] made…so that collateral damage is 
avoided.145 Although certain countries–specifically the United States, Britain, and 
France— had a more direct line to NATO Secretary General Javier Solana (who was 
ultimately responsible for scrubbing the target list) based on the resources they 
contributed, there is ample evidence that shows inputs from many allied countries carried 
significant weight.146 Due to the concerns regarding the legality of certain targets and the 
potential for collateral damage, it often took as many as nine or more people in various 
locations to agree on a single target; if twenty or more civilians might be killed as a result 
of bombing a particular target, the process became even more thorough. Each time a 
collateral damage incident occurred, the target approval procedures became more 
complex and arduous.147 The targeting process throughout the operation highlighted the 
magnitude of political oversight and demonstrated the close connection between 
decisions made at the strategic level and those at the operational level regarding potential 
for collateral damage.     
Of particular concern for many of the members of NATO was the legitimacy and 
efficacy of bombing dual use targets, which included headquarters and ministry 
buildings, dual-purpose industry buildings, and civilian television and radio stations.148 
At the start of the campaign the majority of these targets were off limits. After the first 
weeks, however, frustration caused by Milosevic’s refusal to capitulate prompted an 
increase in the amount of dual use targets struck, especially in Belgrade.149 Even with the 
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increase, the political sensitivity of certain targets constrained military leaders. According 
to General Clark, “I certainly wanted to generate more targets, but my more pressing 
concern was political approval to go after the sensitive targets aimed at the command and 
control at the source of the problem.”150 Clark felt this pressure from both the U.S. 
government and also the governments of some of the United States’ major allies.  
The governments of Germany, Italy, Greece, and France were all hesitant on 
attacking dual use targets and asked that they be “informally consulted” before politically 
sensitive targets were attacked.151 In Vietnam, of course, this type of allied consultation 
was not required. The CRS report on the lessons learned from the conflict pointed out: 
“In the Kosovo conflict…key allies such as the German and Italian governments were 
urging restraint in attacking targets they believed might cause high numbers of civilian 
casualties. Exclusion of such governments from the decision-making process would have 
robbed NATO of the important tool of a united political front.”152 France often expressed 
concern that attacking the wrong targets or ones that had a large potential for collateral 
damage might strengthen Milosevic’s cause. One British official praised the French for 
thinking in political rather than strictly military terms when it came to targeting, although 
a significant amount of evidence points to the increase of bombing dual use targets as a 
key factor for Milosevic’s capitulation.153 Nonetheless, finding a consensus among 
NATO members on which targets were acceptable for attack was a struggle for the 
majority of the campaign, and by tailoring their target lists so they were acceptable to the 
countries with the most sensitivity to collateral damage, air planners were directly 
affecting the strategy of the war.154 
Realizing that certain countries’ governments and civilian populations were 
sensitive to the civilian casualties that collateral damage incidents produced, Milosevic 
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seized every opportunity possible to degrade international support and weaken the 
alliance’s cohesion by propagandizing collateral damage and exploiting each NATO 
mistake. In many cases, media outlets such as CNN were happy to oblige with 
widespread coverage of civilian casualties from incidents like the Serb television station 
bombing, the accidental bombing of a passenger train, and especially the Chinese 
embassy bombing. Because of the limited nature of the war militarily, exploiting images 
of collateral damage was Milosevic’s primary tool for generating any type of impetus 
against the bombing campaign at the international level. In comparison to the Korean and 
Vietnam Wars, the amount of media resources and the speed at which information 
traveled gave Milosevic a distinct advantage over the two previous conflicts in 
propagandizing the bombing campaign.   
In the end, Milosevic’s attempts to exploit collateral damage were largely 
unsuccessful. Because of the extent of the propaganda produced and the speed at which it 
was disseminated, however, there were some constraints on the nature of targets attacked 
and additional authorization requirements early in the conflict. Furthermore, the close 
connection between mistakes made at the tactical level and the consequences at the 
strategic and political level was evident in the amount of resources and time NATO 
invested in explaining each collateral damage incident in order to maintain support.155 
As both the Korean and Vietnam wars demonstrated, Western involvement in any 
conflict always incorporates a battle for domestic approval, and, as Operation Allied 
FORCE continued to drag on, Kosovo proved no different. The conflict in Kosovo did 
not, however, support the argument that public opinion demands a war absolutely free of 
both risks to American military and collateral damage.156 In reality, it was the American 
politicians and media that were more sensitive than the general public to civilian 
casualties caused by NATO’s bombing errors. As Cordesman correctly points out, the 
policy makers and the media’s high expectations of a nearly collateral damage free war 
“helped ensure that neither NATO political leaders nor the Western media was really 
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prepared to deal with the fact that even when bombing is ‘surgical’ people still die on the 
operating table.”157 The quest for wars with little to no collateral damage is a function of 
the strategic and political impacts civilian casualties produce more than the public’s 
aversion to risks associated with strike warfare.158  
C. CONCLUSION 
 The Kosovo air campaign was distinct in many ways from the bombing that took 
place over Korea and Vietnam. Although the total amount of collateral damage during 
Kosovo was minimal in comparison to the two earlier conflicts, some of the same trends 
regarding collateral damage’s impacts were repeated and new concerns were highlighted. 
Many of the new trends arose from the decrease in the disparity between actions taken at 
the operational and tactical level and their subsequent consequences at the strategic and 
political level. Ironically, the improvements in war fighting capabilities and the speed at 
which information traveled, in part, had negative effects on potential and actual collateral 
damage concerns. The Kosovo conflict proved that even with significant advances in 
technology since the Korean and Vietnam wars, problems associated with collateral 
damage and its impact at the strategic and political levels do not go away, they simply 
transform into new challenges. 
                                                 




As the characteristics of strike warfare evolved after the Second World War, so 
too did the concern for collateral damage. Restrictions based on the fear of harming 
civilians have become a central feature of international norms governing the conduct of 
war, and the violation of those norms has become more consequential for political 
leaders.159 The nature of the conflict and the political and military leaders overseeing the 
operations played a significant role in determining the degree to which collateral damage 
considerations impacted strategic and political decisions. Although each war was distinct 
in many ways, there were still common threads among the Korean, Vietnam, and Kosovo 
conflicts that influenced policy makers’ strategic decisions regarding collateral damage. 
Components consistent in all three conflicts, which were linked closely to the concern for 
collateral damage, were the limited aims (and corresponding risks) of the conflicts, the 
gradualist and incremental approach to the bombing campaigns, and the influence of the 
international community and U.S. allies. Within these elements, factors such as the speed 
at which information traveled, the reluctance to expand the war, and the development of 
precision guided weapons all had prominent impacts on strategic and political effects 
from collateral damage. 
A. THE FUNCTIONALITY OF COLLATERAL DAMAGE 
The transformation in the functionality of collateral damage is an important aspect 
uncovered by the progression of collateral damage concerns over the span of a half 
century. During World War II, decision makers and military leaders believed there was 
substantial value in the indiscriminate bombing campaigns over Germany and Japan.160 
The bombing during these air attacks aimed to destroy the war making capacity of the 
enemy, and also, simultaneously but independently, to erode the will of the enemy to 
continue fighting.161 Political and military leaders believed that the amount of collateral 
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damage resulting from the bombing was acceptable compared to the strategic leverage 
gained from those attacks, particularly since most enemy citizens were judged to be 
aiding the war effort in some capacity, if only by their political complicity in the 
regime.162 Consequently, there was utility in the destruction of civilian life and property, 
and concern about it did not have a significant constraining effect on strategic decisions, 
particularly as the wars dragged on. 
During the Korean and Vietnam wars, many air power enthusiasts believed there 
was still some functionality in collateral damage for achieving the desired political 
objectives. The limited nature of those conflicts, however, led political leaders to 
abandon the idea that collateral damage concerns could be entirely subordinated to 
strategic and political objectives. The disparity between political and military thoughts on 
the utility of collateral damage resulted in an increase in the amount of political control 
imposed on military commanders.163 Throughout each conflict, rules of engagement were 
modified continuously and preventive measures such as proscribing the bombing of 
major cities were put in place to try and limit civilian casualties and the destruction of 
civilian property.164 There were still enormous amounts of civilian casualties and 
property destroyed during the Korean and Vietnam wars, but strategic factors like 
preventing outside communist intervention and pressure to end the war from U.S. allies 
decreased the perceived strategic value of collateral damage compared to the past. 
Vietnam and Korea also demonstrated that inflicting civilian casualties for the 
purpose of defeating the enemy’s will to fight did not have the same utility military 
leaders previously thought.165 Instead of decreasing the morale of the enemy government 
and troops, collateral damage effects from bombing ignited a fury that inspired the enemy 
to keep fighting. The three conflicts examined all proved that making life challenging for 
both enemy troops and the civilian populace did not always render them ineffective.166 
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This was contrary to the World War II model on which many military leaders during 
Korea and Vietnam still based their strategic decisions.    
By the time the United States was engaged in the Kosovo conflict, the 
functionality of collateral damage had transformed completely from 50 years earlier. 
Instead of accepting collateral damage as a byproduct of war that was proportionally 
appropriate to the objectives gained, avoiding or minimizing civilian casualties became a 
primary political objective, independent of other objectives. New factors emerged that 
increased the political and strategic incentives to avoid large amounts of collateral 
damage. For instance, the United States was responsible for “cleaning up” the damage it 
caused during bombing operations, so it did not behoove political leaders to bomb 
indiscriminately. Coupled with the obvious moral and legal implications, destroying large 
amounts of property and killing civilians resulted in more resources needed to rebuild the 
enemy’s infrastructure and explain each collateral damage incident to the international 
community.167 The development of precision guided weapons helped decrease the 
problem of widespread damage, but “precise” did not mean that large amounts of damage 
did not occur to the intended target—and to some extent—the surrounding area.  
Additionally, at the end of the twentieth century, the technological advances in 
communication made it possible for political leaders to exert immediate and direct 
control down to the tactical level.168 Because of this level of control, military 
commanders in Kosovo were not afforded the same amount of flexibility as they were 
during the Korean and Vietnam wars. It can be argued that military leaders such as 
MacArthur and Lemay took full advantage of the sluggish speed of communications to 
tailor operations to their liking, whereas General Clark did not enjoy that same 
opportunity. Over time, improved communications have contributed greatly to the 
tendency to interpret actions at the tactical level as having immediate strategic 
consequences; which often means, in turn, that they do have them.169 
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B. FUTURE IMPLICATIONS 
In future conflicts, the concern for collateral damage will undoubtedly be an 
important factor in every phase of war. The unique context of each of the case studies 
presented demonstrates that the type of war the United States engages in will have a 
direct impact on the strategic and political effects of collateral damage. A war with global 
characteristics similar to World War II is unlikely, but worth examining, because it may 
be the only scenario in which collateral damage is recognized as an acceptable byproduct 
of strike warfare on a grand scale.170 In such a case, nuclear weapons may be employed 
and conventional attacks would not be limited to precision guided munitions. If the use of 
nuclear weapons were avoided, reliance on precision guided weapons may decrease 
because their aptitude for mitigating collateral damage would be nullified by the immense 
destructive nature of the conflict. There is a high likelihood that U.S. bombers may find 
themselves in a GPS denied environment that could potentially have an effect on both 
weapon selection and the accuracy of bombing, which would increase the probability of 
collateral damage. 
Moreover, the gap between actions at the strategic level and those at the 
operational and tactical levels would likely remain similar to that seen during Kosovo due 
primarily to the technological advances in communication and the media’s ability to 
conduct near real-time reporting. Because of the increased speed at which information 
travels, the Korean and Vietnam scenarios in which tactical level engagements sometimes 
had delayed or little impact at higher levels is no longer realistic. In turn, decision makers 
would have to accept that the indiscriminate death of civilians and destruction of property 
would be highly visible to the international community. This underscores how 
catastrophic the situation would have to be for our moral principles and political restraint 
to be abandoned completely.  
Additionally, in a war of such magnitude, pressure to conduct a near perfect 
bombing campaign would likely not exist, which may allow policy makers and military 
leaders more freedom when planning and executing operations. It would also bring to the 
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forefront the realization that collateral damage was inevitable—and in fact expected and 
acceptable—which would alleviate trying to defend every collateral damage incident 
after it occurred. This may prevent the enemy from effectively using propaganda 
techniques seen during Vietnam since there would be no upfront expectation for a clean 
and “bloodless” war.171  Under these unrestricted circumstances, U.S. political and 
military leaders may once again adopt the mindset of dropping bombs first, and asking 
questions later.  
In contrast to a war of World War II proportions, the United States will almost 
certainly continue to find itself in wars with limited political objectives against rogue 
regimes or non-state actors. In these types of conflicts, the enemy will use all means 
possible to exploit collateral damage incidents and capitalize on U.S. policy makers’ 
sensitivity to the political backlash created from inadvertently killing innocent civilians. 
In the case of a rogue regime, the United States may find that bombing operations that 
disrupt the civilian population do not expose the political vulnerability of the leader in 
charge, as was the case with Milosevic. Conversely, the scenario might more closely 
mirror that of Vietnam in which the United States thought the enemy was politically 
vulnerable, but underestimated the persistence of North Vietnamese political leaders to 
outlast the U.S. effort while propagandizing collateral damage to their advantage along 
the way.  
Non-states actors present an even bigger challenge to U.S. leaders because there 
are no leverages associated with sovereign territory or a single political leader to use 
against them, yet collateral damage can still be exploited by these groups and employed 
as a political weapon. Groups such as the Islamic State engage openly in the killing of 
innocent civilians and their willingness to use human shields and assimilate with the local 
populace will continue to test the restraint of U.S. leaders. Finding effective bombing 
methods that do not afford the enemy an opportunity to portray negatively U.S. bombing 
operations presents challenges to war planners.  
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Regardless of whether the future enemy is a rogue regime or non-state actors, 
U.S. political and military leaders must find effective ways to deal with collateral damage 
impacts at the political and strategic level. To achieve this, leaders must understand that 
the disparity between collateral damage effects at the tactical and strategic level are not 
what they were during the Korean and Vietnam wars. With that knowledge, U.S. policy 
makers and military leaders must give an honest assessment of the potential for collateral 
damage from the start of a conflict and communicate that assessment openly to the 
American public, the international community, and especially the media.172 It appeared 
the White House was attempting to take a more realistic approach in October 2014 when 
it announced it was easing the policy on civilian casualties in Iraq and Syria to fight the 
Islamic State.173 It remains to be seen, however, if this was an actual attempt to curb 
expectations of a collateral damage free operation, or a statement to cover the legality of 
the bombing.174  
Above all, this process needs to begin with military leaders educating policy 
makers on the realistic capabilities of both the aircrafts’ weapons systems and the 
aircrew, and they must avoid creating the impression that advancements in technology 
allow bombing operations to be conducted in a “perfect” manner.175 Failure to recognize 
the limitations associated with bombing efforts and overinflating the capabilities of 
weapons will result in a repeat of Kosovo in which political leaders found themselves 
scrambling to explain every collateral damage incident because of the unrealistic 
expectations they outlined initially.176 This creates a disservice not only to the audience 
of leaders who portray perfection, but also to the airmen who are expected to execute 
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missions perfectly despite factors such as weapons malfunctions or weather, which are 
out of their control. 
Social media and other outlets that allow information to be disseminated at 
lightening quick speeds will only make controlling the effects of collateral damage more 
challenging in the future. Since the turn of the 21st century, U.S. enemies have been 
remarkably effective at using information technology to exploit collateral damage effects 
and to rally support against bombing operations. As new and quicker ways of publicizing 
information have emerged, adversaries have aligned their propaganda tactics to take full 
advantage of the technology. This is another reason why policy makers need to be more 
upfront and honest about collateral damage being an unavoidable byproduct of war. If an 
administration openly justifies and accepts a proportional amount of collateral damage 
from bombing, it may potentially decrease the effectiveness of enemy propaganda by 
setting realistic expectations.177 
As long as there are bombs being dropped from aircraft, there will be a potential 
for collateral damage. Advancements in technology will not eliminate the concern about 
the inevitable destruction of civilian lives and property; on the contrary, recent history 
suggests they may amplify it, by suggesting that such damage is always the result of 
avoidable error. American aircraft and pilots have become extraordinarily adept at putting 
bombs precisely on target in a variety of difficult scenarios, but it does not mean they are 
perfect. A thorough understanding of the strategic and political implications of collateral 
damage will certainly breed success for future bombing operations and allow U.S. 
political and military leaders to remain one step ahead of the adversary.  
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